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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WARD PERKINS, Personal 
Representative of the 
estate of Norma Perkins, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
and 
GREAT-WEST LIFE ASSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO 
RESPONDENT PERKINS' BRIEF 
Appellant Great-West Life Assurance Company ("Great-West"), by 
and through Clark W. Sessions and Cynthia K.C. Meyer of Campbell 
Maack & Sessions, its attorneys of record, submits the following 
reply to the brief of Respondent Perkins. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Insurance companies have the fundamental right to determine 
the risks they will insure. Legions of cases uphold insurance 
companies' denial of coverage when conditions precedent to coverage 
have not been met. Great-West contracted with Southwest Health 
Management Company, Inc. ("Southwest"), to insure the latter's 
: Case No. 890732-CA 
: 
: Category 14b 
: 
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employees actively at work. The active work requirement is a 
condition precedent to coverage, not an exclusion from coverage 
already in place. 
The group health and life insurance policy underwritten by 
Great-West was non-contributory; that is, employees such as Norma 
Perkins did not pay the premium amounts to Great-West. Southwest 
paid the premiums. Great-West refunded the premiums paid on behalf 
of Norma Perkins to Southwest. Southwest negotiated the premium 
refund check. Respondent Ward Perkins' ("Mr. Perkins") argument 
that Great-West retained the premiums paid by Norma Perkins and did 
not refund the premiums to Mrs. Perkins or her estate is 
unavailing. Mrs. Perkins did not pay the premiums and Great-West 
did not refund the premiums to Mrs. Perkins or her estate because 
they were not paid by her. 
Southwest's characterization of Mrs. Perkins' employment 
status, Mrs. Perkins' hopes or intentions to return to work, and 
her doctor's hopes or intentions for Mrs. Perkins' return to work 
are irrelevant. Indeed, Mrs. Perkins' intentions or hopes are not 
legally within the knowledge of Mr. Perkins, Southwest, or Mrs. 
Perkins' medical doctor. The fact that Mrs. Perkins was not 
actively at work after June 3, 1986, is undisputed and entitles 
Great-West to judgment in its favor. Great-West first learned that 
Mrs. Perkins' last date of active employment was June 3, 1986, when 
it received the Life Claim Report submitted to Great-West by 
Southwest on Mr. Perkins' behalf. Great-West did not know nor did 
it have reason to know until it received the Life Claim Report that 
Norma Perkins' last date of active employment was June 3, 1986. 
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Great-West distributed the EDGE policy booklets to Southwest 
for distribution in turn to Southwest employees enrolled in the 
group health and life insurance program underwritten by Great-West. 
Great-West's contract was with Southwest, and not with the 
individual members of the group, and it was not required to 
directly submit each policy booklet to each employee. Southwest, 
however, may have had a duty to distribute the policy booklets to 
the employees enrolled in the group health and life insurance 
program. Although Mr. Perkins argues that Mrs. Perkins was not 
aware of the information contained in the EDGE booklet, Mr. Perkins 
submitted no affidavits in conformance with Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e) stating that Mrs. Perkins was in fact unaware of 
the policy provisions.1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GREAT-WEST CONTRACTED TO INSURE ONLY 
EMPLOYEES WHO WERE ACTIVELY AT WORK 
Insurance companies have the fundamental right to determine 
the risks they will insure. The Utah Supreme Court in Marriott v. 
Pacific Nat'l Life, 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981 (1970), recognized 
this right in stating that it is not unreasonable for insurance 
companies to impose rules as to eligibility so that coverage is 
only on regular employees of the work force. 467 P.2d at 983. 
Group insurers justifiably rely on insureds' active employment as 
an indication of their relative good health and insurability. See 
1
 It is highly questionable whether such an affidavit could 
pass muster given its hearsay nature and the probabilities of Utah 
Rule of Evidence 601. 
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Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 41 (1981); Credeur v. 
Continental Assurance Co., 502 So. 2d 214, 218 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
Furthermore, legions of cases have upheld insurance companies' 
denial of coverage when conditions precedent to coverage were not 
met. See, e.g., cases cited and discussed at pages 15 through 27 
of Brief of Appellant. 
Great-West contracted with Southwest (not with the individual 
Southwest employees) to insure those employees actively at work as 
defined in the policy. The active employment requirement is not a 
policy exclusion. It is a condition precedent to coverage—a 
requirement for eligibility. Thus, General Motors Acceptance Corp. 
v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983), relied on by Mr. Perkins is 
distinguishable. In that case, Mr. Martinez was denied benefits 
under his credit life and disability policy because of a pre-
existing condition. The pre-existing condition exclusion in 
Martinez was an exclusion of which Mr. Martinez was unaware due to 
what can only be characterized as the insurance agent's gross 
negligence. See id. at 500. Mr. Martinez purchased an automobile 
on a conditional sales contract and was told that in order to 
obtain financing, he had to purchase a credit life and disability 
insurance policy. Mr. Martinez was not informed of the exclusion 
for pre-existing conditions. The car dealer's agent did not 
inquire as to Mr. Martinez' past or present health, Mr. Martinez 
was not asked to sign the credit insurance application which listed 
the coverage exclusions, nor was he provided with a copy of the 
insurance application or the certificate of insurance. Id. Utah 
Code Ann. § 31-34-6(1) required all credit life or credit accident 
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and health insurance to be evidenced by an individual policy to be 
delivered to the debtor. The court stated: 
Because those who purchase such [credit life] 
policies rely on the assumption that they are 
covered by the insurance they buy, the 
Legislature, in the interest of fair dealing, 
has deemed it mandatory that an insured be 
given a copy of the policy so that he can take 
whatever action is appropriate to protect his 
interests and be assured that the coverage 
which he thinks he has contracted for is 
actually provided. It is not consonant with 
our statute for an insurance company to accept 
premiums and then deny liability on the ground 
of an exclusion of which the insured was not 
aware because the insurer had never informed 
him of the exclusion or given him the means to 
ascertain its existence. 
Id. at 501 (emphasis added). The court then held: 
In view of these reasons and the 
unequivocal nature of the duty imposed by § 
31-34-6, we hold that an insurance company is 
estopped from relying upon an exclusion in a 
policy if the company has failed to deliver 
the policy or certificate of insurance to the 
insured or any other documents stating the 
exclusion. 
Id. Obviously, the facts in Martinez are distinguishable from the 
facts in this case. In Martinez, a statute required copies of the 
credit life policy or certificate of insurance containing any 
exclusions to be delivered directly to each individual insured. 
The insurance policy in Martinez was apparently an individual 
policy rather than a group policy. Furthermore, the car 
dealership/insurance agent did not so much as require Mr. Martinez 
to sign the application for insurance coverage which set forth the 
exclusions. Martinez is not applicable to this case. It is 
factually and legally distinguishable. In fact, in Todd v. Dow 
Chemical Co., 760 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1985), the court held that the 
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doctrines of waiver and estoppel "usually cannot operate to extend 
coverage where none exists under the contract." Id. at 195 
(citations omitted). The coverage under the Great-West policy 
never extended to Mrs. Perkins because she was not eligible for 
coverage in the first instance. 
Mr. Perkins simply cannot clear the first hurdle which is 
showing that Mrs. Perkins was actively at work on the effective 
date of Great-West's coverage. Mrs. Perkins' last date of active 
employment was June 3, 1986f some 27 days prior to Great-West's 
coverage taking effect as to any employee of Southwest. (Exhibit 
A to Memorandum in support of Great-West Life Assurance Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment; record at 7, 62, 71). 
POINT II 
NORMA PERKINS DID NOT PAY ANT PREMIUMS TO 
GREAT-WEST AND ALL PREMIUMS PAID ON HER 
BEHALF BT SOUTHWEST WERE REFUNDED TO SOUTHWEST 
Mr. Perkins states over and over in his brief that Mrs. 
Perkins paid premiums to Great-West and that Great-West did not 
return the premiums to Mrs. Perkins or her personal representative. 
Mr. Perkins characterizes these facts as undisputed. See Brief of 
Appellee Perkins at 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11. It is true that there is no 
dispute as to who paid premiums and to whom the premiums were 
refunded. Contrary to Mr. Perkins' assertions, however, Mrs. 
Perkins did not pay any premiums to Great-West. Southwest did. It 
is true that Great-West did not refund the premiums to Mrs. Perkins 
or her estate. Great-West refunded the premiums to Southwest who 
negotiated the refund check. (Record at 169-70). 
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Two points must be made concerning Mr. Perkins' statements 
concerning the payment and refund of premiums. First, this case is 
before this Court on appeal from summary judgment entered in favor 
of Mr. Perkins. Mr. Perkins submitted below absolutely no support 
for his statement that Mrs. Perkins paid premium amounts. Great-
West, on the other hand, submitted an affidavit of John Kingsbury, 
who stated under oath that the policy was non-contributory, that 
is, that the employer pays 100 percent of the premiums, and 
attached a copy of the master card showing that coverage was non-
contributory and that premiums were to be paid 100% by Southwest. 
Mr. Kingsbury also stated that a refund check was submitted to 
Southwest for the full premiums paid on Mrs. Perkins' behalf, and 
that the refund check was negotiated by Southwest (record at 169-
70) There is no genuine dispute as to who paid and to whom were 
refunded the premiums. The only properly supported factual 
statements submitted in the court below were submitted by Great-
West, not by Mr. Perkins. 
POINT III 
SOUTHWEST'S CHARACTERIZATION OF MRS. PERKINS' 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MRS. PERKINS' HOPES TO RETURN 
TO WORK AND HER DOCTOR'S INTENTIONS ARE IRRELEVANT 
In clear and unambiguous language, the group health and life 
insurance policy underwritten by Great-West provides that employees 
are eligible for coverage if, among other things, they are 
permanent and full-time employees working the minimum number of 
hours per week. In equally unambiguous language, the policy states 
that coverage begins on the date the employee completes the 
eligibility waiting period unless the employee is not at work on 
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that day in which case the coverage begins when the employee 
returns to work. (Exhibit D to Memorandum in Support of Great-West 
Life Assurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment, also 
reproduced in Appendix 3 to Brief of Appellant, at p. 17A). The 
qualification section of the Schedule of Benefits states: 
Qualification: You must Work 32 hours per week to qualify as 
a permanent, full-time full pay Employee. The 
Work must be performed at a location other 
than your home. 
(Id. at p. 1 of the Schedule of Benefits). The Schedule of 
Benefits also defines the eligibility waiting period for active 
employees as the later of the plan effective date (in this case, 
July 1, 1986) and "the first day of the insurance month coinciding 
with or next after the date you complete 90 days of continuous 
service." (Id.) Since Mrs. Perkins had been continuously employed 
by Southwest for many years prior to the plan's effective date, her 
coverage would have commenced on July 1, 1986, if she had been at 
work on that day. It is undisputed that Mrs. Perkins was not at 
work on July 1, 1986, and never returned to work. 
Mr. Perkins argues, however, that since (1) Mrs. Perkins 
intended to return to work, (2) Mrs. Perkins' doctor expected her 
to return to work, (3) Southwest considered Mrs. Perkins to be an 
active employee even though she was on disability leave, and (4) 
Mrs. Perkins was receiving accrued sick leave and vacation pay, she 
was an active employee entitled to coverage under the Great-West 
policy. These arguments fail for several reasons. 
First, after June 3, 1986, Mrs. Perkins did not work a minimum 
of 32 hours per week and she apparently was not paid her regular 
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salary or wages; thus she did not satisfy the basic eligibility 
requirements of full-time, full pay active employment at a minimum 
32 hours per week. This, alone, is fatal to Mr. Perkins' claim. 
Mrs. Perkins' hopes to return to work and her doctor's and 
employer's expectations and characterizations of her employment 
status are simply irrelevant. In Elsey v. Prudential Insurance 
Company of America. 262 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1958), cited in Brief 
of Appellant, the Court of Appeals, in upholding a denial of 
coverage, held that "actively at work on full-time" means "actually 
on the job and performing the employee's customary work," and that 
"being on the payroll is not enough." Id. at 435. Mrs. Perkins 
apparently was not even on the payroll after her disability leave 
began. See, e.g. . record at 33 (Affidavit of Mark Toohey dated 
August 30, 1988, indicating that Mrs. Perkins was paid accrued sick 
leave and vacation during her disability leave). 
Second, since Mrs. Perkins never returned to work, she never 
became eligible for coverage. It was Southwest who first alerted 
Great-West that Mrs. Perkins' last date of active employment was 
June 3, 1986, some 27 days before the effective date of coverage 
under the Great-West policy. Had she returned to work, her 
effective date of coverage would have begun on the date she 
returned to work. (Exhibit D to Memorandum in Support of Great-
West's Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 17A). 
Third, Mrs. Perkins' intentions or hopes were not properly 
before the lower court. Mr. Perkins made no representations 
concerning Mrs. Perkins' intentions or hopes to return to work, as 
indeed he could not. Any statements attributable to Mrs. Perkins 
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constitute hearsay, and are not otherwise admissible under Utah's 
Dead Man Rule, Utah Rule of Evidence 601. Consequently, even if 
Mr. Perkins had filed an affidavit in support of his motion for 
summary judgment concerning Mrs. Perkins' hopes or intentions, such 
statements would be improper and inadmissible under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(e). 
Simply put, since Mrs. Perkins was not actively at work on 
July 1, 1986, the effective date of coverage, and never returned to 
work prior to her passing, she was not covered under the group 
health and life insurance policy underwritten by Great-West. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER MRS. PERKINS WAS UNAWARE OF POLICY PROVISIONS 
WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
Mr. Perkins contends that Mrs. Perkins was unaware of the 
policy exclusions2 and that fact estops Great-West from denying 
coverage. Great-West submitted affidavit testimony that the EDGE 
policy booklets were distributed to Southwest for distribution in 
turn to the Southwest employees who applied for coverage under the 
policy underwritten by Great-West. (Record at 71). Mr. Perkins 
submitted no affidavits below stating whether Mrs. Perkins had 
knowledge of the provisions. Indeed, any such statements would 
have to be on Mr. Perkins' personal knowledge since Mrs. Perkins' 
statements to him would constitute inadmissible hearsay. 
Importantly, Great-West made information available to the 
individual insureds by distributing the policy books to Southwest, 
2
 The eligibility requirement in the Great-West policy of 
active, full-time, full pay employment is not an exclusion. It is 
a condition precedent to coverage. 
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the party with whom Great-West contracted. Whether Southwest 
distributed to policy booklets to the employees was not before the 
lower court, but if Southwest breached its duty, perhaps Mr. 
Perkins has a cause of action against Southwest as the plan 
administrator. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 
P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981), that 
[a] party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on 
representations or acts if they are contrary to his own 
knowledge of the truth or if he had the means by which 
with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the true 
situation. 
Id. at 1155 (emphasis added). Even if Southwest did not distribute 
the EDGE booklets and Mrs. Perkins did not have actual knowledge of 
the policy provisions, with reasonable diligence she could have 
become aware of the provisions by requesting the EDGE booklet from 
Southwest. It is uncontroverted that the means existed for Mrs. 
Perkins to learn of the policy provisions. Mr. Perkins submitted 
only argument but no properly supported facts to the contrary. 
Again, estoppel usually cannot extend insurance coverage where none 
existed in the first place. Todd v. Dow Chemical Co. , 760 F.2d 192 
(8th Cir. 1985) . 
The Utah Supreme Court in Larson stated: 
"Ordinarily, in the absence of prejudice to 
the employee or of facts giving rise to 
estoppel, an insurance carrier, may, 
notwithstanding voluntary payment of 
compensation, the furnishing of hospital or 
medical care, the entry of appearance, or 
statement made that the policy covered the 
employee, urge the defense that the employee 
did not meet with an accident, or that the 
policy did not cover the employment . . . . It 
would be unjust to both the employee and the 
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insurance carrier if the law were that when 
the insurance carrier once undertakes to 
provide medical or other care for an injured 
workman it has lost all right to afterwards 
defend against what it believes to be an 
unjust or illegal claim," 
624 P.2d at 1155 (emphasis added) (quoting Harding v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah, 83 Utah 376, 381, 28 P.2d 182, 184 (1934)). 
Mr. Perkins has simply raised no facts giving rise to an 
estoppel against Great-West. Great-West made the policy books 
available for distribution to its employees. Southwest had the 
responsibility to complete that distribution. 
Mr. Perkins' reliance on U & I Properties. Inc. v. Republic 
National Life Insurance Co., 10 Wash. App. 640, 519 P.2d 19 (Ct. 
App. 1974), is misplaced and confused. (See p. 6 of Brief of 
Appellee Perkins). In U & I, the court reversed a finding in favor 
of coverage. In addition, the sentence set off by parentheses in 
Mr. Perkins' brief: "(Mutual Life subsequently approved the 
application, unaware of his death)," is actually a quote of the U 
& I court, referring to another case, Starr v. Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. , 41 Wash. 228, 83 P. 116 (1905). Finally, as 
indicated by Mr. Perkins, although the court recognized the 
principle that insurers who retain premiums knowing of facts 
voiding the policy may be bound by waiver or estoppel, the court 
did not, in fact, hold that the insurer was estopped from denying 
coverage. The Court reversed the finding of coverage. 
Significantly, Great-West did not retain premiums knowing of Mrs. 
Perkins' work status. When Great-West learned that her last date 
of active employment was June 3, 1986, on its receipt of the Life 
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Claim Report, it denied the claim and thereafter refunded the 
premiums. 
Inasmuch as Great-West provided the policy booklets to 
Southwest for distribution to the employees, Mr. Perkins' estoppel 
argument must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Perkins was not eligible for coverage under the Great-
West policy and never became eligible by returning to work. She 
did not pay the premiums to Great-West as the group life and health 
insurance plan was non-contributory, and, in fact, the premiums 
were refunded to and accepted by Southwest. The hopes and 
expectations of Mrs. Perkins and her doctor and employer are simply 
immaterial to a determination whether she was eligible for 
coverage. Finally, Mrs. Perkins' knowledge of the policy 
provisions was not factually supported below. Indeed, it is 
undisputed that Great-West provided the policy booklets to 
Southwest for distribution to the employees. 
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Brief of 
Appellant, Great-West respectfully requests the relief requested in 
Great-West's main brief. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1990. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Appellant Great-West 
Life Assurance Company 
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